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The International Commission
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries:
An Experiment in Conservation Peter Z. R. Finkle*
Introduction
From the sixteenth to the middle of the twentieth century the classical
legal doctrine of the freedom of the high seas permitted the con-
tinuance of unregulated marine fisheries. 1 At least beyond the narrow
limits of the coastal state's territorial sea, the fisherman was generally
recognized as free to ply his trade in whatever manner and to any
extent he chose. Though disagreements about fishery matters were
common in international diplomacy, states did not dispute their
freedom to fish the high seas without regulation. Both in the North-
east and Northwest Atlantic the issues of fishery diplomacy were
largely restricted to marketing problems, landing rights, reciprocal
use of territorial seas and similar problems.
Moreover, little progress was made by the North Atlantic states
in the development of fishery management programs prior to World
War II. The management of fish stocks was first discussed among the
scientists of various states working within the framework of the
International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES). Only
later during the 1930's did conservation of North Atlantic fish stocks
become a matter of serious concern in the world of diplomacy. But
even then the traditional rivalries and suspicions among the European
states of the North Atlantic had spillover effects in fishery manage-
ment discussions, which were characterized by an increasingly hos-
tile political climate up to the outbreak of war. Moreover, the need for
a well developed concept of environmental management had not yet
*Peter Finkle, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Memorial University,
St. John's, Newfoundland.
1. For a history of the international law of fishing, see D. M. Johnston, The
International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy Orientated Inquiries (Yale
University Press, 1965); and A. N. Koers, International Regulation of Marine
Fisheries (Fishing News (Books), London, 1973). For a recent review of Canadian
contributions, see J. Yogis, "Canadian Fisheries and International Law" in R. St. J.
Macdonald, J. Morris and D. M. Johnston (eds.), Canadian Perspectives on Interna-
tional Law and Organization (University of Toronto Press, 1973) 398-409.
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been grasped by the fishery scientists, much less by diplomats or the
public at large. Although the European states knew by the late 1940's
that they would eventually have to accept a reduction in catch if they
wished to solve the problem of stock depletion, most fisheries in the
Northeast Atlantic remained unmanaged until the fishing industries
of the coastal states were faced with ruin.
In the Northwest Atlantic fishery conservation did not become a
diplomatic issue until after World War II. In the Northeast Pacific
fishery conservation had become an issue in bilateral diplomacy
between Canada and the United States somewhat earlier, but mana-
gerial concerns on the Atlantic seaboard had remained less urgent
despite a vexatious history of fishing disputes over rights of capture.
Then rather suddenly, in early 1949, the majority of states fishing in
the region were able to conclude at Washington, D.C., the Interna-
tional Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.2 The sig-
natories included all the coastal states in the region: Canada, the
United States, France (for St. Pierre and Miquelon), Iceland, Britain
(for Newfoundland before Confederation), and Denmark (for Green-
land). Significantly, the Convention was brought into force within a
year of signing by the ratification of four of those coastal states:
Canada, Iceland, U.K. and the U.S.A.. Danish ratification was
delayed by six months. Adherence by the distant water fishing states
of Spain, Norway, Portugal and Italy was delayed until 1952. France,
perhaps acting more on behalf of her distant water fleets than for her
interests in St. Pierre and Miquelon, delayed her ratification until
1953.3
The primary purpose of the Convention was to establish an
international agency to "[provide] protection and conservation of the
fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean, in order to make possible
the maintenance of a maximum sustained catch from those fisheries
".4 The agency was entitled the International Commission for
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). The creation of the
Commission was a surprising development in light of past unsuccess-
ful attempts at fishery management and the large number of fishing
states sharing the marine environment of that region. Moreover, at
the time of the Washington Conference the region had experienced
only very localized depletion of fish stocks in the intensively fished
2. 157 U.N.T.S. 158.
3. See Table 1, appended.
4. Preamble to ICNAF Convention.
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waters off New England. The motivation necessary to prompt the
creation of an international agency appeared to be lacking.
On the other hand, the absence of urgency permitted the states
fishing in the region to negotiate without contemplating immediate
losses which would result from any limit on their catch. Nor did they
have to grapple immediately with the problem of equitable distribu-
tion among the user states. These ICNAF states were, for the most
part, friendly and cooperative. The coastal states of Great Britain (for
Newfoundland), Canada, and the United States had just come
through a period of close collaboration as allies at war. The remainder
of the coastal states (France, Denmark and Iceland) had joined with
the Anglo-Saxon trio in facing a mutually perceived threat from the
Soviet Union. Politically, a more auspicious moment could not be
found. But ICNAF, though created at this opportune moment, had to
face environmental and political changes which would severely test
its structure and processes. While the Commission would not serve as
a diplomatic forum for non-management fishery issues, which were
to remain in traditional diplomatic channels, it did become the main
vehicle for fish management and conservation in the Northwest
Atlantic region.
Authority5
The convention which created ICNAF explicitly recognized the tradi-
tional differentiation between the territorial sea, where the coastal
state exercises exclusive (sovereign) jurisdiction, and the high seas.
The authority of ICNAF extends only to the high seas beyond the
coastal states' jurisdiction. 6
This familiar legal dichotomy has, of course, created an ano-
maly for fishery management in this region, as well as elsewhere.
This conservation regulations of ICNAF (which will be discussed
later) must be made on the basis of biological factors, and the most
obvious of these is that many of the species in the region move
continually between the territorial regime of the coastal state and the
convention waters on the high seas. This means that certain stocks
escape the conservation measures of any one management agency,
since ICNAF and the coastal state sometimes work at cross purposes.
5. This section is derived in part from W. Burke, "Ocean Science, Technology and
the Future Law of the Sea" in C. Black and R. Falk (eds.), Future of the Interna-
tional Order (Princeton University Press, 1970) 183-264.
6. ICNAF Convention, Article 1.
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The gulf between the political and legal realities, which demand
recognition of two management regimes, and the biological reality
that fish move about without regard to artificial lines will not be easily
bridged and may continue to hamper attempts at coordinated man-
agement of fish stocks.
7
The authority which ICNAF wields over the high seas of the
Northwest Atlantic has not, of course, changed the legal nature of
these waters, either for states which adhere to the Convention or for
non-adhering states. Since proposed restrictions under the auspices
of ICNAF must be specifically accepted by the parties, there is no
effective guarantee of a curb on the freedom of fishing. Under the
original Convention procedure, it was provided that all Panel
member states which would be affected by a proposal adopted by the
Commission had to agree to the restrictions before it could come into
force for any,8 and any Panel member state could opt out of the
regulation one year after it had taken effect. 9 States which adhered to
the Convention were thus bound only by their own consent for a
limited period. The procedure required not only unanimity, but active
unanimity - abstention by an affected state killed the regulation for
all states. The 1949 treaty did not interfere with freedom of the seas; if
anything, it expanded the concept!
Steps were taken to correct this anomaly in June 1964 when the
Commission adopted, by Resolution, a Protocol to the International
Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Entry
into Force of Proposals Adopted by the Commission;' 0 and ten years
later this Protocol has now become operative. This modification
replaces the original system with a system of automatic effectiveness
after six months in the case of certain kinds of proposals, and in other
cases with a procedure whereby dissenting member states are re-
quired to file notice of objection within six months. Even in the latter
case, moreover, objection by less than a majority of the states does
not void the measure for non-objecting states: objections merely
delay institution of the regulation for a sixty day period". Though not
a perfect solution to the problem of overfishing in Convention waters,
7. For example, the "sardine" fishery off Maine and New Brunswick.
8. Article VIII, par. 8.
9. Article VIII, par 9.
10. Handbook of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
(1969 ed.) 35. [Hereafter, Handbook]
11. Ibid., at 36.
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it represents an important modification of the right to ignore interna-
tionally agreed conservation measures on the high seas. Yet while it
would seem less than good politics to ignore regulations which other
states have agreed to and are adhering to, on occasion this is still
being done.
12
The authority of ICNAF encompasses not only instituting and
recommending statistical and scientific studies which are the basis for
regulatory action, but also proposing fishing restrictions and regula-
tions. However, since these proposals do not become enforceable as
international regulations over the objections of member states,
ICNAF should not be viewed as a regulatory agency in the proper
sense. While the recommendations of ICNAF may have substantial
political impact, because of the composition of the membership of the
international agency, legally the individual states retain a high degree
of discretionary authority. 13
In order to function as an organization, ICNAF is provided with
a variety of administrative powers. The Commission is required to
hire an executive secretary and, through him, a staff, 14 make a
budget, 15 conduct and call meetings, initiate proposals, undertake
scientific investigations, maintain and collect statistical data and
issue publications. 16 Through its permanent staff, which maintains
permanent office in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, the Commission is able
to maintain an organizational existence with some degree of au-
tonomy.
Membership
Membership is apparently open to those states that share a "substan-
tial interest in the conservation of the fishery resources of the North-
west Atlantic". 17 Sixteen states that satisfy this requirement have so
far adhered to the Convention. All coastal states in the region are in
12. For example, the Danes did so to protect their Greenland salmon fishery in 1971.
13. This is especially true in the context of annual quota negotiations. C. T. Francis
Jr., "Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Arrangements: A Test of the Species Approach"
(1973), 1 Ocean Development and Int'l. L.J. 65.
14. ICNAF Convention, Article III.
15. Article XI.
16. Article VI.
17. This language is used in the Preamble to the Convention to describe the original
contracting Governments. From this it may be inferred that it constitutes the sole test
of eligibility for membership, but the text itself contains no express provision on the
conditions of membership.
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fact members, but even if that were not so, it is likely that any coastal
state in the region, whether or not it conducted a fishery in the region,
would be automatically entitled to membership by virtue of its special
interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources
of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea. 18 Protein-poor, under-
developed states outside the region might also be said to share a
"substantial interest" in fishery conservation, though the Conven-
tion did not anticipate this sort of membership. Other provisions of
the Convention restrict Panel membership to states either conducting
an active fishery in the area or to coastal states situated adjacent to the
subarea. 19 States which have anticipated joining ICNAF have gener-
ally attended one or more annual meetings as an observer before
adhering to the Convention: for example, Japan, Poland, and the
U.S.S.R.
Member states of ICNAF do not agree to any clearly defined
environmental responsibility, merely proclaiming by their ratifica-
tion that they share an interest in conservation of fish stocks. Their
responsibility for the operation of the Commission is, however, quite
clearly detailed. Each member government may appoint three com-
missioners as well as one or more experts or advisers; 20 however,
each state casts but one vote. 21 Besides being obliged to provide
commissioners, the states also bind themselves to undertake financial
obligations, as necessary, to sustain the Commission.2 2 Member
states may be called to provide one of their Commissioners to serve as
chairman of various Panels and committees. 23 Any ICNAF member
state may send non-voting observers to attend meetings of commit-
tees or Panels of which they are not members.
24
18. The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas (559 U.N.T.S. 268) provides in Article 6, that
1. A Coastal State has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of
the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea.
2. A Coastal State is entitled to take part in an equal footing in any system of
research and regulation for purposes of conservation of the living resources of the
high seas in that area, even though its nationals do not carry on fishing there. This
principle of special interest is generally believed now to be established in
customary international law, so that it can be invoked by coastal states which have
not expressly given their consent to the 1958 Geneva Convention.
19. ICNAF Convention, Article IV, par. 2.
20. Article II, par. 2.
21. Article II, par. 7.
22. Article XI, par. 1.
23. See, for example, Article IV, par. 1.
24. Article IV, par. 5.
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Ten years or more after adhering to the International Conven-
tion, states may terminate their membership in ICNAF, if six months'
notice is provided. States may withdraw at any time, however, with
one month's notice should they receive notice of another state's
termination of membership. 25 No state has so far withdrawn from
ICNAF, though Canada and the United States have threatened to do
so. Non-member states are neither bound by ICNAF nor required to
join, even if they fish in the ICNAF area. Political pressures, how-
ever, are such that almost all states fishing in this region have joined,
some even before extensive fishing operations were undertaken. 26
Bulgaria and Japan are the most recent new members.
TABLE I
Membership of ICNAF
Date of Adherence of Ratification
State











Federal Republic of Germany*





1 September 1949 C
15 December 1949 L
13 February 1950 C






















*Indicates Adherence, did not attend Washington Conference in 1949.
**C indicates behaved primarily as coastal state
L indicates behaved primarily as long distance fishing state
The Commission is specifically directed by Article X of the
Convention to maintain liaison with other public international or-
ganizations: both the International Council for the Exploration of the
25. Article XVI.
26. For example, Italy and, more recently, Japan. At the time of writing, the
German Democratic Republic is the only non-member state with extensive opera-
tions in ICNAF convention waters. Cuba has observer statutes only, but it has not yet
developed substantial commercial interest in the region.
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Seas (ICES) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations are specifically mentioned.2 7 The representative
from the FAO took a continual and active part in the proceedings at
the annual meeting which the author attended in 1971.
The member states now number sixteen, so that the distant
fishing member states outnumber the coastal member states by three
to one. 28 The coastal states, because of their proximity to the fishery,
use relatively small vessels and less sophisticated equipment which is
designed specifically to operate near shore facilities. The permanent
nature of their dependence on the nearby fishery tends to make them
the chief supporters of conservation measures, though several, such
as Canada, are losing enthusiasm for international measures and
would prefer to be free to establish more stringent national measures
instead.
The long distance fishing states usually delay and sometimes
oppose ICNAF conservation proposals. These states must use larger
ships, since they are usually denied the assured use of shore facilities
to process and store their catch, to transfer crews or store equipment.
Their fleets are also designed for diversified fishing, making them
less dependent on particular fishing grounds. Vessel versatility tends
to produce less interest in conservation. A more important factor,
however, determines these states' behaviour in ICNAF. A large catch
must be sustained if their large fishing units are to operate economi-
cally, especially in the wake of largescale capital investments. Those
states whose equipment is most modern and those states who, in other
ways, are dependent on large sustained catches, are believed to be the
states least likely to acquiesce in restrictive measures. While it is
difficult to prove this from public records, interviews with officials
and observers tend to sustain this belief. The Soviet Union, Poland,
Romania, and the Federal Republic of Germany are examples of
capital intensive fishing states in the region which seem reluctant to
adhere to conservation measures. Japan, a relatively new member of
ICNAF, can be expected to show a similar reluctance. The German
Democratic Republic, still a non-member at the time of writing, is
now being drawn into the ICNAF quota sharing arrangement, but is
not yet legally bound to observe its conservation measures.
The other long distance fishery states are generally more
cooperative unless a specific interest is being threatened. They are, in
27. ICNAF Convention, Article X, par. 1.
28. See Table 2, appended.
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general, less dependent on the fishery, operate older equipment, or
possess "historic rights" which have been honored by the coastal
states when they have extended their jurisdiction in order to provide
protection for their inshore fishery. Given the diversity in interests of
the membership, it is not surprising that the institutional arrange-
ments of ICNAF have served more to mitigate than resolve their
differences.
Structure
Unique among fishery organizations, ICNAF subdivides its authority
into five geographic subareas. 29 For each subarea there is a separate
panel, membership in which is based on "current substantial exploi-
tation in the subarea ... except that each Contracting Government
with a coastline adjacent to a subarea shall have the right of represen-
tation on the panel for the subarea. "30 The panels provide a small and
intimate forum for states using the area to discuss mutual problems
and plans, including those of catch allocation. The panels are respon-
sible for keeping under review the fisheries of their subarea and
scientific and other information relating to them. They may recom-
mend to the Commission that investigations be carried out and joint
action taken. They may also make recommendations for the altera-
tion of the subarea boundaries. 3 '
The panel meetings have developed into two-part proceedings.
The scientific and technical meetings are held a week or so prior to the
regular annual meeting of the panel. These scientific meetings are
both an attempt to formulate a common scientific evaluation of the
subareas' fishery population trends and an opportunity for the presen-
tation of biological research data which, while it may have no direct
bearing on fishery management, is of scientific interest.
29. ICNAF Convention, Article I.
30. Article IV, par. 2. This provided an early illustration of the trend towards
recognizing the "special interest" of the coastal state, evidenced in Article 5 of the
1948 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas and further reflected in current proposals for treaty recognition of the
coastal states' right to establish an exclusive economic zone up to 200 miles. See D.
M. Johnston and E. Gold, The Economic Zone in the Law of the Sea: Survey,
Analysis and Appraisal of Curr-Trends (Occasional Paper No. 17, Law of the Sea
Institute, University of Rhode Island, 1973).
31. ICNAF Convention, Article VII.
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Management Policy
A heavy dependence on scientists to provide justification for man-
agement restrictions was originally provided for in the provisions that
".... each Panel, on the basis of scientific investigations may make
recommendations to the Commission for joint action, 32 and that the
Commission may .... transmit .... proposals for joint action by the
Contracting Governments .... ,,33 These paragraphs effectively
bound both the Panels and the Commission to the need for justifica-
tion on biological grounds. In practice, disparities in the volume and
quality of research have reduced the effectiveness of conservation
policy discussions under this system of geographical subdivisions
based on shared interests.
The use of scientific principles as the basis for fishery manage-
ment decisions has, however, now been modified. A 1969 Protocol
enlarged the basis upon which regulatory measurements must be
justified, so as to include "economic and technical
considerations' '34; and the New Rules of Procedure enjoin the Com-
mission to ".... consider economic and administrative problems
involved in the application of [regulatory] measures". 35 Despite
these changes, the 1971 annual meeting and subsequent meetings
have not manifested any lessening dependence on scientific
justification as the basis for regulatory measures.
Despite the utility of geographically-oriented forums there has
remained a need for meetings organized around problems encompas-
sing the entire ICNAF area. The member states began as early as
1952 to organize ad hoc committees in order to provide continuing
negotiation of functional issues which transcend the geographical
lines of the subareas. The use of ad hoc committees became for-
malized in the New Rules of Procedure adopted in June 1969.36 This
charter revision created Standing Committees on Finance and Ad-
ministration, on Research and Statistics, and on Regulatory Meas-
ures. An unusual feature of these Committees is that observer status is
granted to non-member states and public international organizations
such as the North East Atlantic Fishery Commission, the Food and
32. ICNAF Convention, Article VII, par. 2.
33. Article VIII, par. 1.
34. See Protocol relating to Panel Membership and to Regulatory Measures, Arti-
cles II and III, in Handbook 39-40.
35. See Rule 64 in Handbook 48.
36. Handbook 43.
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Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International
Council for the Exploration of the Seas, and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development. Voting privileges are ex-
tended only to member states in ICNAF, who are entitled to member-
ship on all committees, standing or ad hoc.
Significantly, these modifications of the formal structure of
ICNAF neither affect the procedure by which recommendations of
regulatory measures must be approved, nor do they change the
requirement for biological justification of management measures.
The provisions do, however, enlarge the field of discussion to include
the consideration of economic and administrative problems involved
in the application of management measures. The present structure of
ICNAF thus combines both regional and functional features.
The Commission's attachment to "scientific management" ap-
parently reflects the hope that neutral principles may be found in
science on which the participating states may be able to base a
consensus. If so, this would alleviate the incredible complexity and
difficulty which may result from "open" negotiations between
fishery states that vary drastically in their economic condition, fish-
ing capability, technical expertise and fishing interests. Hopefully,
biological sciences would provide a common perspective on man-
agement "demanded" by "nature" in a particular fishery, with
science providing a bridge between, for example, the Soviet Union
and Portugal through "proof" of their common need for conserva-
tion measures. Biological investigation is necessary, in any event, if
there is to be any management effort at all.
Despite the pleas of economists3 7 , the use of economic princi-
ples does not offer the neutrality of biology, nor are such principles
equally valid for all states. To postulate economic efficiency as a
management objective is to assume that states would pursue efficient
practices, as the economist understands it, if they had the requisite
knowledge. Governments have many motivations, however, and
efficiency can not be listed as having any particular priority, and
indeed the very definition of economic efficiency may not be agreed
upon by the states participating in a shared management system like
ICNAF. Finally, while the penalty for ignoring efficient practice may
be serious monetary loss, there may be exacted an even heavier
37. See, for example, J. Crutchfield, "Common Property Resources and Factor
Allocation" (1956), 22 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sc. 292; and A. Scott, "The Fishery:
The Objectives of Sole Ownership" (1955), 63 J. Pol. Econ. 116.
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penalty if the states ignore biological considerations - namely, the
depletion of the fishery.
In effect, the use of biological justifications for fishery regula-
tion for over 20 years has cast doubt on its utility, at least as it has
been employed by ICNAF. The crucial problem is that the research
upon which management decisions should be based is undertaken by
biologists on behalf of member states. The work may thus be unre-
lated to management problems, and when it is of direct utility, its
origins in a particular state may compromise the integrity of the
findings.
Scientific findings are especially tentative in the complex field
of marine biology. The limited sampling allowed in marine biology,
combined with a multitude of possible variables, leads most resear-
chers to state their conclusions with utmost caution. States reluctant
to permit conservation measures, therefore, have an ally in the honest
biologist who reports his findings as inconclusive and advocates
more research. 38 It is possible, of course, to take action on the basis
of such findings, but not if the research must be used to support the
action. Since states which oppose restrictions in a fishery find legiti-
mation in the need for scientific justification, the unfortunate conse-
quence is the continued exploitation of a fishery until it is nearly
depleted. It is only at the point of near depletion that the findings of
biologists become unequivocal.
The recent salmon controversy between the two North Ameri-
can states and Denmark illustrates another dimension to the problem
of scientific justification of management measures. The antagonists
presented biological research with contradictory findings. The
Danes, who fish for the Atlantic salmon off the coast of Greenland,
claimed that the fishery was not being depleted by their efforts;
rather, they were taking fish which would otherwise suffer natural
mortality. Reduced salmon runs on North American rivers were
attributed to other natural factors. The two American states, which
had spent substantial sums in attempts to ease the passage of the fish
on their way to the spawning grounds, claimed that reduced runs
coincided with the increased intensity of Danish fishing. The scien-
tific evidence being disputable, negotiations in ICNAF reached an
impasse. These fruitless discussions were, of course, not solely due
38. This kind of statement was heard frequently at the meeting this writer attended in
1971.
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to the use of scientific justification for management measures; how-
ever, this ICNAF doctrine is a contributory factor since the parties are
encouraged to negotiate without fully discussing their relative politi-
cal, economic and legal positions.
3 9
The technique of using scientific advice to avoid difficult politi-
cal and economic questions demands a neutral science which ICNAF
has not provided. Even if a neutral science could be institutionalized
and the inherent uncertainty of marine biology were overcome,
scientific management cannot provide the formula for distributing
losses which might result from conservation measures.
Scientific advice might better serve international fisheries man-
agement if placed in a more humble position. The problems are not
only biological; they involve political, economic, legal and sociolog-
ical problems as well. If negotiation more openly encompassed the
full scope of human problems involved in the fishery states, perhaps
"tradeoffs" and compromises might be more readily attained. The
use of science to avoid these admittedly intricate considerations has
not, on.balance, been successful. We cannot know how successful a
more open negotiating process might be, since the process has not
been engaged in.
Process
The process of negotiation at the annual ICNAF meetings is complex,
and because some of the discussion occurs in private, it is difficult to
research. In public the meetings appear dominated by the United
States and Canada. The North American states field the largest
delegations, present the largest number of research papers, and
initiate the majority of conservation recommendations. 40 While the
number of advisers sent to the meeting is partially a result of proxim-
ity and internal politics, it also is indicative of the level of interest and
importance attached to the meetings by the respective states. Simi-
larly, though the research presented may be a manifestation of afflu-
ence, proximity and level of expertise available, it is also evidence of
the interest of these states. At present the interest of the two coastal
39. At the 1971 ICNAF Annual Meeting the "scientific" confrontation reminded
one of the scholastic debate on how many angels can stand on the head of a pin.
40. This preponderance is seen more clearly in the original papers than in the edited
selections which appear in the Annual Proceedings oflCNAF [hereafter Proceed-
ings ].
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states of North America seem to require then at times to act out an
adversary relationship with the other states of ICNAF.
The degree of participation by non-coastal member states cor-
responds closely with perceived interest in the subject-matter. The
Soviet delegation, for example, was deeply involved in negotiations
over the procedures to be used by international inspectors. 4 ' The
Danes participated in discussions concerning the salmon fishery. 42
The coastal states of North America, on the other hand, take part in
almost all the discussions, reflecting their interest in all aspects of the
fishery. Most member states, however, remain inactive; and given
the procedure necessary to bring restrictive measures into force, they
apparently do not feel it necessary to participate unless threatened or
under pressure.
Public diplomatic dissent from management restrictions is voi-
ced, with astonishing regularity, by reference to an alleged lack of
scientific proof that the restriction under consideration is necessary.
The frequency of this objection, without further explanation, illus-
trates the extent to which scientific management has been used to
circumvent negotiation over conservation policy and delay manage-
ment measures.
Informal negotiation has been particularly important at ICNAF
meetings, for continuity in the personnel representing the member
states has remained high. 43 This has allowed negotiators, experts and
advisers to form relatively long-term acquaintances with their coun-
terparts in other states. The technical nature of the proceedings has
also served to limit the turnover in personnel, since each country has
only a limited number of experts on which to draw. Also, ICNAF's
charter and negotiating tradition have stressed science, ensuring that
a large proportion of those in attendance are biologists who share a
common discipline which perhaps has a more fraternal tradition than
most. There are, moreover, potential diplomatic advantages in in-
formal negotiation where negotiators need not take refuge in the lack
of conclusive biological evidence. Professional diplomats assure us
that in camera negotiation, away from the glare of public discussion,
is the most fruitful. Unfortunately, it is difficult to show that informal
41. The U.S.S.R. and others illustrated this by their concern over inspection
procedures, which was discussed at the meeting of the Regulatory Measures Com-
mittee in 1971.
42. At the 1971 meeting the Danes pressed their displeasure with the salmon
restrictions at all the appropriate places, including Plenary, Panel and in private.
43. See Table 2, appended.
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"contacts" have been much more successful than the formal. The
delegations conduct negotiations within parameters that are deter-
mined by domestic groups, economic necessity and expectations of
what is diplomatically feasible. It is thus doubtful whether quiet
diplomacy can do more than provide private explanations for public
postures.
TABLE 2
Average Number of Personnel At Recent Meetings*































































*Average number of people sent to Annual Meeting over 1966, 1968, 1970,
and 1972. If state was host country that year is omitted.
**Per cent of Personnel the same from 1966-1970, 1968-1972 averaged.
***Source: Annual Statistical Review of Canadian Fisheries, Ottawa, 1970.
Note: Bulgaria, the newest member, is omitted from this table.
In summary, the Commission has failed to overcome what can
now be seen as the major impediments to the successful conclusion of
international negotiations on fishery management issues. The princi-
ple of the freedom of the high seas remains essentially the same as in
the pre-ICNAF period; and the Commission procedures for bringing
management policy into effect still permit states to opt out. This tends
to circumvent or delay negotiations. The role of science within
ICNAF has frustrated negotiations in a variety of ways. It is even
dubious whether biological justification for management restrictions
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would be workable if ICNAF retained and deployed a neutral re-
search staff of its own. Marine biology may be instrinsically too
tentative to fulfill the role anticipated by ICNAF, even under op-
timum research conditions. Finally, perhaps the most difficult of all
the problems which ICNAF has not been able to overcome is that of
the diversity of opinion among member states on the meaning of
conservation and the necessity for it. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the processes of implementation and enforcement.
Implementation
Implementation of conservation measures in ICNAF is inseparable
from the process of negotiation. Difficulties in implementation, all
too easily, may become rationalizations for not agreeing to manage-
ment schemes. The process of creating enforceable rules follows the
procedure laid out in Article VIII of the Convention with all its
pitfalls. The closeness of management planning and implementation
can be seen in the history of the Commission before and after the
changes in procedure proposed in the 1964 "Protocol Relating to
Entry into Force of Proposals Adopted by the Commission."
44
The Commission's history will be divided into three parts, in
order to focus on the various problems which it has encountered.
Movement from one phase to the next was, of course, gradual, not
abrupt, determined by changing attitudes, important political and
legal changes, changes in conservation techniques, as well as discus-
sions and resolutions within ICNAF which may not have been ratified
by all the member states. The period from 1950-1964 is characterized
by very little regulatory activity carried out under the auspicies of
ICNAF. This generalization is valid, despite the almost immediate
imposition of mesh regulations to protect the haddocks in subarea
5.45 This measure may be considered atypical since only two states
had seats on Panel 5 and agreement in this subarea proved easily
negotiable until the Soviet Union asked for and received membership
in 1962. More usually, there was little success achieved in the effort
to secure ratification of regulatory measures recommended by the
Commission.
The discussions at the Annual Meetings reveal that the method
considered "appropriate" for fishery conservation was to create
44. Hnadbook 35.
45. 2 Proceedings (1952) 13, 14 (discussed); 3 Proceedings (1953) 8 (into force).
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selective inefficiency through minimum mesh size restriction on
trawl gear. The most favourable aspect of mesh regulation is that it
need involve little or no loss to the fishing unit. The restriction results
primarily in loss of small immature fish, which are both lighter and
less valuable. The paramount benefit to the fishery is that sexually
immature fish are permitted to mature and breed, thus increasing the
possibility of continued high catches.
Despite the apparent simplicity of the objective, mesh regula-
tions are difficult to design with scientific reliability in order to
produce the maximum sustainable yield for a particular species in a
given fishery. Moreover, the scientific demand for accurate assess-
ment of the requirements of a given species in an area clashes with the
administrative demand for a simple and general standard. This clash
was noted quite early and, given the ICNAF charter, was resolved in
favour of the demands of biology. 46
Another, and equally complex, problem which militated against
mesh regulation during this period had its origins in the multiplicity
of states fishing the Northwest Atlantic. The states used trawl gear
made of a variety of materials and designed in various ways. The
incomparability of the fishing gear thus made the imposition of fair
restrictions on efficiency an intricate business, since all the gear had
to be rendered equally inefficient. Several disputes surfaced at the
Annual Meetings of ICNAF during this period and, in fact, blocked
the bringing into force of conservation measures. 47 Even into the late
sixties, when advancing technology was tending to produce more
comparable fishing gear, the same problem re-emerged. 48 While it is
difficult to judge whether the issue was used as a rationalization in
order to avoid the imposition of restrictions, it is one which has arisen
with some frequency, especially during this period.
The most important reason that this period failed to produce
conservation programs lies less in technical issues, or the role of
science, than in the relative disinterest of the member states in
conservation. Depletion may have begun before the middle sixties in
scientific terms; i.e., the catches were regularly exceeding the max-
imum sustainable yield. The total catch, however, continued to rise,
commensurate with the increased effort until the middle sixties. Only
when it became obviously difficult to sustain and increase the yearly
46. 4 Proceedings (1954) 8; 7 Proceedings (1957) 12.
47. 6 Proceedings (1956) 14, 15, 16.
48. 17 Proceedings (1967) 19.
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catch did the scientific evidence complement the economic realities
in a way which induced concern in the member states.
4 9
The beginning of the second period coincided with a renewed
effort to manage the fishery. This was signaled in 1964 by the
resolution of the Commissioners to change the Convention by a
Protocol which would facilitate the bringing into force of conserva-
tion measures. 50 While ratification of this Protocol by all the mem-
bers was delayed until late 1969, the fact that two-thirds of the states
in ICNAF were willing to adopt this relatively drastic change in
procedure manifested a new attitude toward the problem of fisheries
conservation. The effect of this 1964 Protocol was to place recalcit-
rant states in the unenviable position of being specifically named as
states who are unwilling to conserve a resource when most of the
states feel it necessary.
The period between the proposal of this 1964 Protocol and its
entry into force in December 1969 was a frustrating one for the
Commission. Most of the states had modified their attitude toward
conservation, and the pressure for strict regulation substantially in-
creased, especially amongst the coastal states. Negotiations, how-
ever, dragged on without result, despite a decided leveling of the total
catch in the face of sustained and increased fishing effort.
States favouring conservation measures made yearly amend-
ments to proposed trawl regulations in a vain effort to induce ratifica-
tion by other member states .51 Under the original rules any one of the
opposition states could prevent the institution of restrictions by mere
neglect. Results were slow in coming: in 1966 ratification was
achieved in subarea 5, but only in late 1969 were regulations brought
into force in subareas 1-4.
The major stumbling block to conservation measures during this
period thus appeared to be procedural. The ratification of the Protocol
discussed above, as well as others, 52 served to ease the barrier to
49. The question of exact measurement of fishing effort is a difficult one. It was
studied by ICNAF Tangentially in R. Beverton and V. Hodder (eds.), Report of
Working Group of Scientists on Fishery Assessment in Relation to Negotiation
Problems (1962).
50. Handbook 35.
51. See 14-18 Proceedings (1964-68).
52. Protocol Relating to Panel Membership and Regulatory Measures. Proposed
1969, Handbook 39. Ratified 1971, 22 Proceedings (1972) 9. Protocol Relating to
Measures of Control. Proposed 1963, Handbook 33. Ratified 1969, 20 Proceedings
(1970) 8.
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bringing ICNAF regulatory measures into force. Ironically, the in-
stitution of these measures served only to pose a new and more
difficult problem since overfishing continued despite a flurry of
conservation measures.
The mesh regulation introduced during 1969 predictably proved
to be a failure. States remained free to compensate for the decreased
efficiency of their gear by increasing the intensity of their fishing
effort. Since they new restrictions were ephemeral, resulting in only
minimal economic loss and no reduction in catch, they can not be
considered an adequate test of the new procedure for obtaining
ratification.
This new design for facilitating ratification of conservation
measures contained the seeds of its own failure, since states were
permitted to opt out of the regulatory scheme by simply declining to
participate. The states which so chose might undergo political criti-
cism but this could be endured for specific gains. While no states
have, to date, exempted themselves from the mesh regulations,
several states have utilized this procedure in order to avoid conserva-
tion measures relativing to Atlantic salmon53, and to avoid, or
perhaps postpone, the imposition of various other regulations and
enforcement practices. 54 There is little doubt that the threat of avoi-
dance is real; states will risk political isolation in order to pursue
certain practices which yield enough of an economic or other reward.
States that wish to pursue controversial or strict restrictions are thus
forced to compromise, risking the implementation of an inadequate
management scheme in order to get universal adherence. The new
procedure, however, is somewhat better than the original method of
bringing regulations into force.
The failure of mesh restriction forced the Commission to con-
sider other methods of protecting the fish stocks. Closed seasons and
areas, like mesh regulations, are an attempt to permit and facilitate
breeding. These regulations, unlike mesh regulation, are relatively
easy to implement. Despite the simplicity in concept of closed sea-
sons, the biological knowledge required to positively identify spawn-
ing times and areas requires a high degree of sophistication. The
regulations were first instituted in the ICNAF area in 1972. 55 Unfor-
53. States to exclude themselves were the Federal Republic of Germany,
Denmark and Norway. 20 Proceedings (1970) 9.
54. Soviet Union and Romania avoided the full impact of enforcement schemes
restricting inspectors to deck areas. 22 Proceedings (1972) 10.
55. 22 Proceedings (1972) 10.
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tunately, like mesh regulations, these restrictions can not prevent
depletion since they do not get to the problem at its roots. While a mix
of these regulations may protect spawning areas and immature fish,
only quotas on the total catch of a species have the effect of decreas-
ing fishing pressure on the stocks. A quota on a species, combined
with mesh and other restrictions, can serve to reduce the intensity of
fishing effort expended on the species, as well as protecting the
immature and spawning fish. However, without the quota to reduce
the take, very little can be achieved to reduce depletion.
Quotas on a species, however, must be divided up between the
competing claims of 15 states. While scientists may supply an ap-
proximate maximum sustainable yield which may be used as the total
quota, no formula exists to divide this figure amongst the states.
What makes the bargaining more difficult is the nature of the
"game", for if country "A" receives a given quota, it reduces the
amount available to the other states. This characteristic of the negoti-
ations tends to reduce the chances for compromise.
A further complication results from the claims by the coastal
states to a "preferred position". This demand reached its zenith at the
1973 Annual Meeting when the Canadian delegation insisted that the
coastal state be allowed to fish up to the limits of its capacity, with the
remainder of the maximum sustainable yield to be distributed
amongst the distant fishery states. 56
ICNAF is now in the third period, when the issues of conserva-
tion authority and quota allocation have to be resolved. How and
when these issues will be resolved depend to a large extent on the
outcome of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea and the
resulting pattern of regional fishery diplomacy in the Northwest
Atlantic. 57 The necessity of implementing fisheries conservation by
the use of quotas is only part of the problem. Any conservation
measures to be effective must be enforced.
Enforcement
If the Commission is to survive the seventies, an adequate enforce-
ment mechanism must be established. This requires that internation-
ally created legislation be both enforced and violators punished with
56. Daily News, St. John's A.P. dispatch, June 4, 1973.
57. D. M. Johnston, The Regional Consequences of a Global Fisheries Convention,
prepared for Fourth Regional Workshop of the law of the Sea Institute, Rhode Island,
held at Hamilton, Bermuda in January 1974. [Publication pending].
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equal vigour in order to assure that the conservation regulations are
not moot. At present the ICNAF states manifest a diversity of
views towards ethics, legal norms and law enforcement. They also
represent a wide variety of social systems. These differences create a
natural barrier to mutual trust and assure that, even if all the member
states attempt to comply with the Commission's regulations, there
would remain the possibility of misperception.
Were the differences among the states the only barrier to ade-
quate enforcement, the problem would be substantial, but other dif-
ficulties complicate the situation further. The legal problem of en-
forcing international legislation provides several complex conceptual
and practical problems. Traditional approaches to international law
require that international regulations be given effect, at least in most
areas, by domestic legislation. 5" Enforcement power is vested in
domestic agencies. The ICNAF members are thus responsible for
passing domestic regulation to implement the Commission's en-
forceable regulations, as well as making provisions for both the
enforcement of its laws and assuring that adequate penalties are
meted out to violaters. The Convention recognizes these duties when
it provides that ". . . governments agree to take such action as may
be necessary to make effective the provisions of this Convention and
to implement any proposals which become effective under paragraph
8 of Article VIII."
59
In member states where power is divided among various agen-
cies, bureaus or branches there is a danger that the national govern-
ment will be unable to proceed with the necessary steps to implement
the Commission's regulatory decisions. In practice some of the
national agencies responsible for various aspects of implementation
may interpret or perform their duties in such a way as to defeat the
purpose of the regulation.
This enforcement system has remained basically in effect during
the life of ICNAF, but it was modified to provide for international
inspection in Convention waters in January 1971 .6o This change in
the enforcement system was made possible by several bilateral and
multilateral experiments in exchanging inspection personnel, which
proved the idea practical. 61 The Joint Inspection Scheme is a limited
58. H. Briggs, The Law of Nations (1966) 60-61.
59. ICNAF Convention, Article XII.
60. 22 Proceedings (1972) 10.
61. 17 Proceedings (1967) 21; 18 Proceedings (1968) 21.
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tool, since the inspectors can only report detected violations to the
appropriate domestic authorities and to ICNAF. The inspectors
themselves cannot impose penalties for violation, nor can they force
recalcitrant branches of the state to impose ICNAF restrictions and
provide publicity.
The nature of the regulation, in effect, imposes limits on the
usefulness of on-the-scene observations. Infringements of mesh reg-
ulations, for example, are detectable only if the fishing unit can be
caught in the act. Another problem for inspectors is that there exist
unregulated species for which any size trawl may be used, as well as
two types of trawls which are permitted on regulated species. Thus,
unless the trawl is actually being used in violation of a restriction,
detection is difficult. The trawl regulations attempted to close this
loophole by requiring a vessel fishing for unregulated species to have
in its possession less than 10% by weight of the regulated species or
2268 kilograms, which ever is greater. This rule is designated to take
account of incidental catches of regulated species by ships fishing
unregulated species. 62 These complex regulations depend partly for
their reliability upon accurate measurements of weight.
The use of quota or any weight regulation depends on the
cooperation, accuracy, and veracity of state authorities who have not
made the regulations, and who may even profit from their non-
application. The fatal flaw of quota regulations is that their enforce-
ment lies in the hands of the same domestic authorities that report the
statistics. It is unlikely that this dilemma can be resolved by extension
of the international inspection system to the shore facilities. This
conclusion may be reached even on the benevolent assumption that
such breaches are not a deliberate policy. There exists the possibility,
of course, that governments may choose not to report their catch
figures accurately. They may, within limits, attempt to act decep-
tively, or with deliberate neglect.
Since ICNAF regulations are so much in the hands of domestic
authorities, perhaps the problem of enforcement reduces itself, at
least partially, to the trustworthiness of states. It is unfortunately
difficult to evaluate the extent of trust which the members of ICNAF
repose in each other. Manifestations of trust observed at the Annual
Meetings presumably are unrealiable, since proper diplomatic be-
havior tends to conceal contrary indications. The personnal familiar-
ity which many Commissioners and advisers share cannot be taken as
62. ICNAF Trawl Regulations: A Simplified Guide and HANDBOOK 75, 76.
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indicators of good faith, since state policy takes precedence, and
diplomatic practice assures that friendship among diplomats will be
used as domestic policy demands. Interviews which the author con-
ducted with fishery officials and industry representatives revealed
an apparent disquiet at the thought of trusting various ICNAF mem-
bers. No one interviewed expressed the opinion that unqualified trust
could be expected or given. 63 The Commission, like other interna-
tional organizations, is at the mercy of the interstate system, which
has repeatedly demonstrated that expectations based upon trust can-
not be viewed with equanimity.
Conclusions
In assessing the Commission's performance, it is necessary to con-
sider its activities from several different perspectives. The most
obvious criterion is how effective ICNAF has been in preserving the
fish stocks of the Northwest Atlantic. The total catch in the ICNAF
area has increased for most species from 1950 to 1973; scientists,
however, believe that the maximum sustained yield has been surpas-
sed for nearly every commercially useful species. Several species
which were once found in abundance in the Northwest Atlantic are
now commercially extinct. 64 Where crude and primitive methods
once yielded a decent catch of cod, now only the most sophisticated
equipment and intensive fishing produce a commercial yield. In
terms of the criteria which were adopted in the preface to the conven-
tion, ICNAF is a failure. If we assess the state of the fishery less
scientifically and ask the Newfoundland fisherman for his opinion,
he will say that the Newfoundland inshore fishery has been in the
decline for at least ten years. Whatever method of assessment is
considered, the verdict is not favourable.
The effect of ICNAF upon the economic efficiency of the
fishery is even more difficult to guess at than its effect upon the fish
stocks. Before the imposition of quotas, the fishery would, like most
fisheries, be considered inefficient because of the increasing excess
capacity and the mesh and other regulations which neither promoted
efficiency nor protected the stocks. Most economists agreed that the
common property nature of the fishery was the paramount economic
63. These interviews were conducted between 1968 and 1973. They involved
people with a variety of fishery backgrounds.
64. The haddock is the most expensive and publicized species which is close to
commercial extinction.
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problem.6 5 Since the fishery was international, the problem was
apparently in diplomacy. A step in this direction has been taken with
the introduction of a system of annual quota negotiations under a new
formula, which is heavily weighted in favour of the coastal states.
Under this system each fishing state is free, theoretically, to deter-
mine for itself how to allot its fishing effort in order to sustain the
greates benefits. A fleet may take its quota by fishing quite inten-
sively for several months, utilizing full capacity, and then redeploy to
other locations. The quota system which is now being gradually
imposed will have beneficial economic effects by allowing planning.
While ICNAF took little notice of the arguments of fishery
economists for most of its life, there is evidence that currently such
arguments are being examined anew.
On a more abstract level, ICNAF is an example of an active,
functional international organization which has been relatively effec-
tive in adjusting to the idiosyncratic features of its member states.
Some international enforcement has been accomplished, which even
at a relatively modest level is considerable achievement. More impor-
tant, the member states have permitted the normal ratification process
to be reversed by deliberately placing themselves in a defensive
political posture in relationship to international regulations. On the
other hand, ICNAF has not resolved the problems which Iceland and,
to a lesser extent, Atlantic Canada perceive to be crucial. The coastal
states' special dependence on the sea has been recognized by ICNAF;
however, the coastal states feel that action to protect the fisheries has
not been taken with sufficient vigour and alacrity.
The coastal states of Iceland, Canada and the United States have
now adopted the position that their proximity to the fishery entitles
them to special status, duties and privileges. This concept, if pressed
to the extreme, might threaten the survival of ICNAF. The manager-
ial role of the Commission will be drastically reduced, at the least, if
management decisions are taken exclusively by the coastal states
within 200 mile limits. To survive at all ICNAF will have to find
additional means of satisfying the demands and aspirations of these
states in the context of international negotiations.
More particularily, if ICNAF is to survive it must become more
vigorous in its efforts to conserve the fishstocks of the region. Even if
the Commission could purge itself of an overdependence on scientific
management, this would not necessarily cause recalcitrant states to
65. See supra, at note 37.
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change their behaviour, only their arguments. It is far from clear what
changes the ICNAF states will be willing to accept in the structure
and procedings of the organization. Evidently, many of the non-
coastal ICNAF states are determined to resist any proposal at the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea which would signific-
antly impair the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas and
permit the enforcement of management decisions in ICNAF waters
without their consent.
Since these states have recently acquiesced in the adoption of a
quota system, there would seem to be some reason for optimism
about the future of ICNAF, but closer appraisal leads to more cauti-
ous conclusions. The quotas based upon the state's catch during the
past year merely limit future expansion, which is biologically limited
in any case. The coastal states apparently acquiesced in this in order
to establish the system and because they obtained special, larger
quotas. There is little likelihood that this allocation system on its own
will reverse the depletion of the fishery.
The inevitable conclusion is that the distant water states will
continue to pursue their present intensive fishery until biological
collapse forces them to change their policy. By that time, however,
Canada and perhaps the United States as well will be forced by
domestic pressures to move to some type of exclusive control of the
fisheries on their continental shelves. Iceland's example has stimu-
lated increased pressure on the Canadian government to act. Since
Canada has a greater interest in fisheries and has recently shown a
tendency to be innovative in marine law, she is likely to move to
exclusive controls if ICNAF policy remains unchanged.
The long distance fishing states will have little reason to com-
plain in the future about the demise of ICNAF; they had twenty years
during which it could have been prevented. The coastal fisherman in
Canada and the United States, however, may wonder about the
diplomatic and biological expertise which presided over the gradual
depletion of the Northwest Atlantic fishery; for when exclusive
control is seized, the coastal states will inherit a depleted expanse of
ocean which was once a great fishery.
